Introduction
During the nineteenth century, the indigenous Saami people of Lapland underwent a curious transformation in the eyes of the state officials who governed them. What had been a group of equal citizens was slowly turned into a primitive people without land rights. While previously the Saami had been able to register their land rights, by the mid-nineteenth century the customary grazing grounds of the Saami were taken into state ownership and increasingly parceled out to settlers. For the state governments ruling over Saami lands there was nothing peculiar about this. According to them, the lands had always been state lands and the Saami had only limited usage rights.
The case of the Saami dispossession is an anomaly, a European example of the practices generally associated with colonial settler states. At the same time, it is a typical case of indigenous dispossession in the nineteenth century, where agriculturalist settlers displaced nomadic indigenous peoples. The purpose of this article is to examine the intellectual history of the nineteenth-century indigenous dispossession as a legal process. Using the Saami case as a starting point, the aim is to trace how different instances of dispossession rested on surprisingly similar intellectual foundations. As a global phenomenon that defined nineteenth century colonialism, indigenous dispossession was driven by economic motives and population expansion, but it was justified by varied, often contradictory and mostly utilitarian theories. Earlier scholarship has interpreted the legal foundations of dispossession mostly within the national legal traditions, giving limited attention to the transfer of ideas like the terra nullius doctrine. 1 In contrast, this article argues that behind the legal justifications of property that span from Spanish neo-scholasticism through nineteenth-century theories. 8 Theories of the superiority of individual ownership and the lack of indigenous ownership of land were instrumental in the legal process of dispossession that dominated the nineteenth century colonial experience. New scholarship has increasingly recognized how the colonial experience was shaped by the meeting of conflicting ideas about property and land. 9 What this article seeks to argue is that there were in fact two narratives of property and progress that influenced colonial dispossession. The first narrative grew from the theory of savage outlawry, the idea that uncivilized indigenous peoples possessed no rights and were beyond human community -a narrative that developed in reaction to the discovery of the Americas and was popular in the early international law discussions. The second narrative grew from the nineteenth-century theory of the gradual development of civilization and property that was refined through historical studies and proved influential in the creation of anthropological theories of evolution. What this study seeks to provide is a new approach that links two global developments. The first concerns the development of the legal doctrine of dispossession and the second concerns the development of its practice. This study demonstrates how the two developments were interlinked. Like all links between theory and practice, demonstrating them is problematic as evidence can be tenuous. The writings of a scholar like Locke about property rights are not the reason why the indigenous peoples lost their lands during the nineteenth century, but such writings may be seen as indicators of a tendency to evaluate property rights in a certain way.
The latest scholarship has maintained that legal discourse was of secondary importance and there was considerable ambiguity about indigenous land rights among colonial actors. Legal doctrines were imported from the colonial centers, but indigenous property rights were determined primarily by the political situation.
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In addition to the history of colonialism, the imposition of Western law, and the misrepresentation of indigenous legal ideas, the intellectual history of the dispossession of indigenous peoples also has contemporary legal relevance through the movement for the restoration of indigenous land rights. Through a number of landmark cases, the litigation surrounding restoration claims has forced settler states to revisit the process of dispossession and its legal justification. The historical and legal re-evaluation of this history has served as simultaneous processes in which the actions of the settler states have been criticized and even reversed.
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Analysing a global development of immense complexity and scale is necessarily a comparative enterprise. When tackling a multifaceted issue such as the dispossession of indigenous peoples on a global scale, where the strongest uniting factor appears to be chronology, the main task is to track connections and transmissions between processes taking place globally. This kind of interconnectedness has been studied through various lenses, 11 See Attwood (n 1) 289. 12 contracts to rent, sell and buy land, and when there were quarrels over land rights, these were taken to the local courts.
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The situation changed only in the mid-nineteenth century, when new legislation over land use in the North was discussed especially in Norway and Sweden. In the process, a new theory was proposed, claiming that the Saami were a nomadic people with no understanding of ownership comparable to that of 'civilized peoples'. Some made references to racial theories and the perceived inferiority of the Saami, others noted that they were pagans. In general, the arguments were based on evolutionary theories: The Saami were nomadic traditional Saami lands were revoked. As was typical in the treatment of indigenous peoples and settlers, Saami rights to lands were based on unwritten practice, while settlers were granted title to the land. As the land registries were being formed at the same time, this division became increasingly embedded into the system of land tenure. 18 The Saami had, at best, usage rights to public land, while settlers were given full title.
Saami land rights were on the whole precarious. In Sweden and Norway, for example, there was a lengthy debate extending to the latter half of the twentieth century over whether the This remarkably uniform procedure appeared to take place within the major regions of the world where colonialism as a process was significant. 24 What is noteworthy is how well this corresponded to the history of Saami dispossession as described by scholars like Ahrén. 21 The centrality of land tenure is evident even in contemporary accounts, see, for example, Merivale (n 9). 22 The term "native" is here used solely as a historical term as used by contemporaries to denote the indigenous inhabitants in opposition to European settlers. 23 There are naturally numerous variations and in many cases just the first two or three steps were taken.
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If we follow this outline in the general historical development of colonialism in the nineteenth century, the impression of similarity is further strengthened. In the first stage, state sovereignty over indigenous populations was asserted. As Lisa Ford has maintained, this took place within a few decades in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Though initially tribes and other indigenous groups were treated as sovereign states, in an uncannily simultaneous process during the 1820-1840s they were legally reduced to being under the overall jurisdiction of the settler state. 26 This takeover was often justified by the lack of civilization as a sign of the lack of sovereignty.
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The legal doctrine of ownership came into play during the second stage. Because natives were considered not to have similar conceptions of private ownership and instead appeared to practice some kind of communal or tribal system of land tenure, the land was habitually considered to be state land, which it held in trust for the natives. The Roman law of usufruct was often employed to convey the idea that the natives were allowed to use the land undisturbed, but they are not allowed to sell it. The practical purpose of this policy was often thought to be philanthropic, to protect the natives from exploitation and dispossession that would lead to the transfer of lands to white settlers.
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In the third stage, usually under pressure from settlers and other local economic interests to put the land to more efficient use, land surveys were made to separate what were considered vacant lands. Those lands were then distributed to willing parties, which were often settlers 25 The examples selected are by no means exhaustive nor do they claim to be representative on a global scale. In the fourth and final phase, allotment of native lands, the lands reserved for natives were distributed among the inhabitants, for example, those living on the land or those belonging to an entity such as a tribe. The privatization of lands often gave, for the first time, full title to the natives. In the US, this was exemplified by the termination policy. In many cases these allotments were not viable economic units and have often resulted in further loss of traditional lands through the selling of privatized lands.
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As stated, this very simple sequence corresponds with the events taking place in Lapland.
However, this simplistic sequence of dispossession has no explanatory value in itself. In the following, I first explore how this development unfolded in various parts of the world, and the variations in how these actions were conceptualized in different legal cultures. While there is undisputable appeal in a common trajectory, what is noteworthy is that while there were similar developments, rationalizations and practices, the shared traits were always taking place within the context of the local legal system, mixed with elements and vocabulary that were specific to a time and place. Thus the meaning of words like crown, state, wardship, protection, waste, trust and development were deeply contextual. 
North America: Sovereignty and International Law
In certain respects, the context of the North American indigenous dispossession is closest to the Saami experience, since in both cases there had been centuries of cohabitation before important changes led to a rapid dispossession. 31 However, they show an interesting discrepancy. In the US, the legal framework of dispossession was in the first place formed These conceptions were close to those of the Europeans. In fact, along with Blackstone, the philanthropic community heavily criticized the fiction of terra nullius and conquest to legalize what they considered to be the shameless plundering of the property of the natives.
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The idea that individual ownership was a sign of civilization functioned also in reverse:
granting indigenous peoples individual titles would encourage individual initiative and progress. This was the rationale in North America, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia.
The conviction that aboriginals were uncivilized , the remnants of the evolutionary process that had advanced and left them behind, had other tragic implications. For example, in Victoria, the Aborigines Protection Act of 1886 promoted the idea that half-castes, the children of mixed parentage, were capable of being incorporated into civilized society. Pureblood aborigines were confined to stations and reserves with the expectation that they would become extinct, while half-castes would merge into the white society. The tool for assimilation would be the experience of individual ownership of land. In practice, the policy took a ruthless turn in that half-castes were to be separated from full-blooded aborigines, which meant that they were to leave the community to merge with the white society, sometimes when as young as four years old .
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In New Zealand, the chronology of events resembled closely the general scheme of indigenous dispossession, though the sequence varied from region to region. Nonetheless, were usually efforts to limit the transfer of land from the natives to Europeans and to protect native farmers as a way to limit social instability. The appropriation of indigenous lands led to both legal and political problems all around Africa. The Italian colonial administration encountered similar issues in trying to reform the convoluted traditional system of land tenure in Eritrea, which had become an Italian colony in 1890. The aim was to give land to settlers, but instead the effort led to a revolt. 65 In the British Empire, the idea of indigenous communalism was cemented in 1921 in the Privy Council case Amodu Tijani, which rejected both the use of the legal notion of terra nullius in Africa and the feudal interpretation of chief's rights. 66 Instead, the court ruled that the lands were communally owned by members of the tribe. 67 However, it instituted another universal system of land rights, one based on communal ownership. 68 It had a tremendous impact all around the British Empire, and it was used as an authoritative guide around the world.
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In East Africa, a multitude of land laws restricted full title effectively to European holdings and the feudal assumption of the supreme title of the Crown enabled land transfers to European plantations. 70 Even later attempts to protect indigenous holdings were unable to stop the encroachment of European commercial farming on native lands. The Southern African development is an interesting case to compare with the Saami dispossession, as there was a similar line of argumentation that resulted in the transfer of land ownership from the indigenous population to the state or Crown. A second similarity was that the indigenous land rights that were recognized were bound to continuous usage. However, the most pervasive difference was the concept of trust used liberally to describe the overlapping land rights by the Crown, chiefs and people. Thus the arrangement may be described as a fairly odd combination of feudalism and paternalism.
The Ideology and Science of Land Tenure
From the survey of comparable cases, it is evident that while there was no direct comparison for the policies used in the Saami dispossession, the similarities were striking nonetheless.
From these similarities, it is apparent that there were two shared convictions that shaped the colonial systems of land tenure and the Saami dispossession. The first was the linkage that was seen between rights and civilization. The second was the belief that there was an inherent a means of dispossession, they were also ways of controlling both the settlers and the natives. 72 In Africa, land tenure has been one of the major post-colonial policy issues engaging governments, international organizations, NGOs and donor agencies. The issue of land reform has often been linked with ideas of securing land tenure and thus encouraging investment and fighting poverty. Peters (n 1) 1317-1318. 73 Heartfield (n 9). The negative view of the rapacious settler is evident in Merivale (n 9). However, modern observers largely agree with Banner that such philanthropic efforts were usually not successful beyond isolated cases. Banner (n 3).
The debates over land tenure also held a rich subtext in the history of Western political philosophy over the idea of property. As mentioned in the introduction, there were two main lines of argument that had been advanced in the legal and political scholarship since the early modern period. The first was the denial of nearly all rights to the 'savages', a theory originating from early international law scholarship that maintained that indigenous peoples like the American Indians were too uncivilized to be reckoned as a people who could, as a rule, exert ownership and be protected in their ownership rights. The second was the theory of the development of civilization and its linkage to ownership, which claimed that historically man had progressed from early communalism to private ownership and thus there was a fundamental unity in the developmental narrative. These two theories were both influential in the justifications of colonialism and indigenous dispossession, but because they were often used simultaneously and in conjunction with other theories like the popular racial or climate theories, telling them apart can be difficult.
The idea of the lawless and propertyless savage found its most influential expression in the theories of terra nullius. The colonial theory of terra nullius was founded loosely on the American Indians and South Africans were all equally thought to be able to advance their conditions through the experience of civilization. As in the case of the Saami in Lapland, the civilizing process was often inseparable from the process of assimilation.
The most enduring shared idea is that of indigenous tenure as something distinct and separate from regular ownership of land. In all of the cases, indigenous land holdings were unequal to those of the white settlers and conceptualized in a different manner. While settler ownership was permanent, based on written procedure and protected by land registries, indigenous tenure was dependent on occupation and usage, liable to be lost if either would cease.
Indigenous tenure would often be based on the good grace of the state, while settler ownership would be protected even against the state's incursions.
Finally, one may ask whether the legitimacy offered by the various theories on indigenous land tenure had an effect in the process of dispossession? What has often been overlooked is how much the appearance of legitimacy counted in the self-understanding of many of the colonial powers and settler states, who had to take into account a public opinion often favourable to philanthropic ideals. We must not forget that there was vocal public opposition to openly dispossessing indigenous peoples in cases like the US Indian Removal Act, the application of the terra nullius doctrine in Australia, not to mention numerous incidents in Africa. Though colonial land policies in Africa and elsewhere were from the 1960s onwards condemned as the evils of colonialism, the tenor of earlier observers was very different, describing colonial governments as protectors. 114 As in all Nordic countries with Saami populations, the colonial governments saw themselves as the proverbial good shepherds, protecting the indigenous population from themselves while administering the land in a beneficial and rational manner. In the administrative sense, the belief in the legal validity of their own actions and the rights of the government to the land were based mostly on the tautological arguments of the governments themselves, repeated ad nauseam, until scholarly activists like Slattery began to question the validity of the claims themselves.
The issues were very complex and there are no simple answers due to the myriad ways in which these processes took place, a fact that has often been clouded by straightforward narratives of dispossession and genocide. As has been shown, the theories formulated by jurisprudence and anthropology played an integral part in the developments and their justifications, creating an appearance of beneficial and legally-sound actions. Instead of approaching the issue as pure top-down imposition or oppression, it has increasingly been shown that there was a dialogue between the colonial center and its periphery as well as various indigenous and colonial actors. 115 However, in the latest studies the role of law has been problematized as the linkages between legal doctrine and the colonial world in the practice of indigenous dispossession have proven to be increasingly complex. 116 As always, it is difficult to demonstrate beyond any doubt the extent to which the history of ideas directly impacted upon colonial practice. It would be easy to say that what was written in a few elite universities in Europe for an academic audience was confined purely to the ivory tower. However, the colonial discourse shows how it was permeated by the same ideas of development and the juxtaposition of primitive and civilized. Not only were the decisionmakers of the colonial service often educated in the same universities, but also the public discourse in newspapers, events and publications were influential in the spread of ideas. 
